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Abstract
Despite ongoing research over the last 15 years, the presence construct remains
somewhat limited in its ability to be applied beyond the sensory domain. In order
to increase its usefulness for applied challenges (e.g., using presence theory to enhance simulators’ effectiveness), a discussion about a new conceptualization of presence is introduced. This novel perspective on presence is rooted in the notion of
“experiential design,” an approach businesses use to create strategically compelling
and memorable experiences. The paper begins with a brief review of presence and
then a description of the concepts of experimental design. Following this, a theoretical model of presence, based upon experimental design, is offered. Using this
model, an exploration on the mitigation of breaks in presence is offered (a break in
presence occurs when presence fails to be maintained). These ideas are presented
in order to improve the likelihood of presence emerging for simulation participants
and to enhance interdisciplinary researchers’ shared conceptualizations of presence.

1

Introduction

Presence is often described as a subjective sense of “being there” in an
environment (Heeter, 1992). It was later defined by Lombard and Ditton as
being the “perceptual illusion of non-mediation” (1997). According to these
definitions, presence occurs when a person cannot distinguish between sensory
input from a hardware-mediated environment and sensory input from reality,
and thus responds to the hardware-mediated input as though it came from the
real world. In effect, these definitions describe presence as a problem of restricting perception to only the mediated environment.
Many factors are theoretically believed to be causally related to presence. In
a recent article, Lee listed the findings from more than 30 presence articles
that address causal factors that are “either empirically identified or theoretically
argued” to be “closely associated with” presence (Lee, 2004, p. 495). He lists
25 factors, ranging from the participant’s mood to the image resolution of the
simulator, that affect presence. It is important to note that Lee’s review was
not intended to be comprehensive; however, its concise presentation effectively
demonstrates one of the challenges of presence research. Namely, a categorization system is needed to better understand, and make use of, the many disparate factors that influence presence. (For additional reviews of models of pres-
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ence see Sacau, Gouveia, Ribeiro, Gouveia, & Biocca,
2003; IJsselsteijn & Riva, 2003; Schuemie, van der
Straaten, Krijin, & van der Mast, 2001; and Draper,
Kaber, & Usher, 1998.)
Given the diversity of sensory stimuli that may influence presence, it is no surprise that researchers have
looked at existing models of perception to see how they
fit with mediated environments. Mantovani and Riva
(1999) describe how Gibson’s ecological model of perception can be applied to presence. In the model, a
feedback loop exists whereby an organism acts in some
manner that will have an effect upon an environment,
and in response to organisms, the environment acts in
some way so as to have an effect on other organisms.
Perception in such a system is the manner that one organism uses its individual ontology to identify available
resources from the environment and to then act upon
the environment. The environment does not provide a
unique marker for each individual. Uniform information, or an affordance, is available to any organism acting in a manner where this information would be required. Depending on the organism and how it acts,
these affordances will be interpreted differently. Thus,
affordances rely heavily on context.
In an earlier attempt to correspond Gibson’s model
with presence, Zahoric and Jenison state that “presence
is tantamount to successfully supported action in the
environment” (1998). A virtual environment will carry
within it affordances that the user will interpret in some
manner depending on his or her goals within the VE.
This realization is important for the design of virtual
environments, as the design goal becomes less about
environmental realism, and more about environmental
support of the desired user behavior.
Witmer and Singer address the complexity of presence by splitting it into the subjective levels of involvement and immersion a participant feels inside a
simulated environment (Witmer & Singer, 1998).
Immersion measures the fidelity of the perceptual information coming to the senses and is dictated by the
hardware capabilities of the system. Involvement defines
the ability of the environment to construct a convincing
and relevant experience based on the sensory information to the user. This view was influenced by Fontaine
(1992), who described presence as a degree of focus.

Thus, presence should be concerned not only with
maintaining the immersive capabilities of the system,
but also with the ability of the environment to correspond to the immersive experience the hardware inherently provides.
Zahoric and Jenison’s, Witmer and Singer’s, and
Lee’s review are included here to help illustrate one of
the problems inherent with today’s presence research.
As yet, there is no suitable, agreed-upon framework
with which to conceptualize our knowledge of presence.
While a common operational understanding of presence
has emerged from the vast number of studies on contributing factors, there is less agreement on a model for
why presence emerges. Given the range of perspectives
and disciplines considering this construct, there may
never be a universally-accepted definition. However,
without such a model, we are less able to effectively advance our understanding, or improve our utilization, of
these known contributing factors.

2

Information-centric versus Knowledgecentric Design

Existing models of presence are useful but restricted. They suffer from two limitations. First, many
models tend to focus heavily on perceptual issues while
focusing less attention other facets of virtual experiences, such as cognition and emotion. However, recently, there has been an encouraging trend to further
study cognitive factors (e.g., Sas & O’Hare, 2005;
Nunez, 2003). Second, as mentioned above, these
models fail to provide an interpretable, extensible framework with which to understand and apply the theoretical principles to practical applications.
To better conceptualize these limitations, researchers
should consider the relationship between information
and knowledge. Data, information, and knowledge are
often defined in a hierarchical relationship, where data
consist of the least complex structures and knowledge
the most complex ones. Data are discrete facts, figures,
or even unassimilated raw observations (Davenport &
Prusak, 1997). Information is structured data, and at
the highest level, knowledge is structured, abstracted,
and transitive information. In other words, knowledge is
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“the link people make between information and its potential applications” (Baker & Badamshina, 2002, p. 7).
Current virtual environments are primarily conceptualized as information technologies, while they should instead be considered “knowledge technologies.”
This relationship between information and knowledge
lies at the heart of Gestalt psychology. Nearly a century
ago, Gestalt theorists realized that an experience is
greater than the sum of its parts. That is, people contrive knowledge about their experiences “beyond the
information given” (Bruner, 1973). This realization
helped lead to our understanding of schema theory
(Neisser, 1976), and it has been extended to explain the
binding problem, which is “basically, the problem of
how the unity of conscious perception is brought about
by the distributed activities of the central nervous system” (Revonsuo & Newman, 1999; this is discussed in
more detail later in this paper).
However, the traditional perceptual approach to understanding presence may be considered informationcentric (i.e., primarily concerned with the presentation
of data). Instead, effective virtual environments should
be considered knowledge systems (i.e., designed so that
their inherent information is encapsulated as a holistic
experience). Subsequently, virtual environments should
be designed with participants’ overall experiences in
mind, which (according to this analogy) would transform them from information-centric to knowledgecentric systems.

3

How Do We Design Experiences?

How can we design a knowledge-centric system?
First, it is necessary to consider academic constructs of
an experience that may support this purpose. Following
that, a discussion of experiential design theories and
how they may relate to mediated environments and a
holistic model of presence is in order.

3.1 Defining “Experience”
Forlizzi and Battarbee (2004) offer an in-depth
definition of experience; a limited portion of their definition is offered here. They describe an experience as

something that can be articulated, named, and schematized within a person’s memory. Experiences of this type
have beginnings and ends, but anticipation of, and reflection on, the experience may take place before or after the event.
A managed experience is achieved when experiential
design is strategically applied to environments or activities in which groups or individuals will interact. Research into managed experiences in virtual spaces—such
as online environments, computer-based simulations,
or simulation-based training—is limited. The modest
number of publications that do consider virtual experiences tend to focus on the consumer experiences of
e-commerce portals (e.g., Tscheligi, 2005; Patricio, Falcão e Cunha, Fisk, & Jardim Nunes, 2004) or distributed communication (e.g., Battarbee, 2003). However,
researchers can gain new insight from considering experience design in the context of simulation and training.

3.2 Experiential Design: A Marketing
Approach
Experiential design is a marketing approach used
to craft strategically compelling and memorable encounters. In experiential businesses, the customers pay for
the feelings of engaging in the experience, over and
above the costs associated with the goods and services
alone (Schmitt, 2003). For businesses, the outcome of
experiential design is higher earnings; however, it is the
process that achieves that outcome that is of interest
here.
Experiential designs are successful when they encourage people to create meaningful emotional and social
connections—personal narratives that involve episodic
memories, and positive associations with the artifacts of
that experience (such as a particular product, in marketing terms; Battarbee & Mattelmäki, 2002). In this
model, prior experiences are neither discarded nor ignored as irrelevant, but are rather integrated into the
success of a given product. This process could also be
advantageously applied to mediated environments in
order to achieve greater levels of presence, and by extension, potentially lead to better performance (Barfield,
Zeltzer, Sheridan, & Slater, 1995).
According to Pine and Gilmore (1999), the core of a
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successful experiential business is its ability to create
“mass customization,” or services that resemble theater,
where the staff are actors, the goods are props, and the
customer is the star. Schmitt (2003) describes this as
connecting with the customer at every touchpoint and
integrating different elements of the customer’s experience. He uses the term “touchpoint” to refer to any
interaction between a customer and the product/company, such as when the customer uses the product, sees
an advertisement for the product, or even just talks
about it with friends. Experience design is concerned
with sales and brand preferences, and providing customers with value— before, during, and after sales— by delivering information, service, and interactions that result
in compelling experiences. In order to achieve this, the
product or storefront is carefully designed to engage the
consumers on five dimensions: physical, cognitive, affective, active, and relational (Pine & Gilmore).
Presented here is a new multidimensional heuristic
that applies Pine and Gilmore’s sensory, cognitive, affective, active, and relational dimensions to presence. The
sensory dimension includes all sensory input—visual,
aural, haptic, and so forth—as well as perception of
those stimuli. For simulation, the sensory dimension can
be represented through hardware and software (e.g.,
Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005; Zahorik & Jenison,
1998; Flach & Holden, 1998).
The cognitive dimension encompasses all mental engagement with an experience, such as anticipating outcomes and solving mysteries. For simulation, much of
the cognitive dimension can be interpreted as task engagement. Note that level of engagement is not necessarily correlated with a simulation’s degree of fidelity
(e.g., Ma, 2002). Instead, task engagement here is related to the intrinsic motivation, meaningfulness, and
continuity (actions yielding expected responses) of an
activity.
The affective dimension refers to a participant’s emotional state. For simulation, this dimension can be
linked to the degree to which a person’s emotions in the
simulated environment accurately mimic his or her emotional state in the same real-world situation. For example, does a participant feel the same degree of arousal in
a dismounted infantry simulation as he or she would in
the real-life equivalent?

The active dimension relates to the degree of personal
connection a person feels to an experience. Does he or
she incorporate the experience into his or her personal
narrative; does he or she form meaningful associations
via the experience? For simulation, one can associate the
active dimension with the degree of empathy, identification, and personal relation a participant feels with the
simulation’s scenario, environment, and avatars.
The relational dimension is composed of the social
aspects of an experience. For simulation, this can be operationalized as co-experience— creating and reinforcing
meaning through collaborative experiences (Forlizzi &
Battarbee, 2004; Battarbee, 2003). Experiences that are
created or reinforced socially are usually stronger than
individual experiences and they further enable individuals to develop personal and memorable narratives (Battarbee, 2003).

4

Presence and Experience

What should be clear from Lee’s review (2004) is
that presence is an emergent factor due to the interaction of many components; in other words, it is a result
that is greater than the sum of its parts. These components can be related to experience by following the operationalizations outlined in the previous section.
Therefore the goal of the mediated environment designer should not only be creating an environment, but
also creating an experience. The purpose of this is twofold.
First, by utilizing experience, a more personal connection to the environment can be achieved. While it
remains to be tested through experimentation, it is
hoped that such a personal connection would lead to a
strengthening of the factors that contribute to the
emergence of presence. Existing research data and theories suggest that the elements of presence are highly
interconnected (Witmer & Singer, 1998; Slater, 2002b;
Nunez, 2003; Nunez & Blake, 2003). Thus, one future
area of research will be to apply factor analytical methods, in an attempt to validate the experiential construct
with empirical data.
Second, strong experiences contribute to new schema
being formed, or when possible, new information being
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Table 1. Example Causes of Breaks in Presence
Category

Description

Example

External
interference

The outside world interferes.

Internal
interference

The internal world interferes.

Inconsistent
mediation

The mediated environment fails to
consistently support its output
message or media.
The mediated environment
contradicts participants’
established schema.

A participant is engaged with a dismounted-soldier
simulator, but he or she can hear people in the
next room discussing their lunch plans.
A participant is engaged with a computer-based
task trainer, but something distracts him or her,
and he or she begins daydreaming about his or
her upcoming vacation.
A participant is engaged in a virtual-flight
simulator, but the program freezes or runs
slowly when there are too many agents onscreen.
A participant is engaged with a police simulator.
He or she is tracking a (simulated) suspect
through a building, but he or she is distracted
when trying to open a door that, he or she
learns, he or she cannot interact with because
that area of the building was never programmed.
A participant is working with a virtual library. Each
attempt to articulate a request for information
returns massive amounts of data, most of which
is irrelevant and atypical of an actual library
experience. (Information overload.)

Contradictory
mediation

Unrefined
mediation

The mediated environment evokes
too many (potentiallycontradictory) schemas.

added to existing schema. This has an important implication for training environments, since stronger experiences tend to beget better information retrieval.
It is important to note that not all successful VE’s are
likely to require the same types or degrees of experiential design; instead, different combinations of the experiential dimensions will probably best support different
types, or training subjects, of simulations. Once validated, the experiential-presence model can lead to a
framework with which to appraise and compare virtual
environments. For example, the types (e.g., affective or
social) of experiential stimuli the presence contributing
factors used can be documented. That combination can
then be analyzed for various factors, such as the breaks
in presence outlined in Table 1. With this information,
the likelihood of a presence being maintained on a particular set of stimuli can be quantified. This lessens the
need for direct participant involvement in the presence-

evaluation process and gives simulation designers another way to analyze their success, in terms of presence,
before participants are added into the equation.

5

Breaks in Presence

An application that can immediately be addressed
by this new conceptualization of presence is to examine
times when presence is absent; in other words, to define
presence by examining its opposite: lack of presence.
Slater (2002a) proposes that presence is merely concerned with maintaining the perception of an environment, and that presence is the degree to which the secondary environment overrides awareness of the primary.
Thus, presence is achieved when the primary environment is no longer noticeable, and a break in presence
(BIP) occurs when a participant attends to the primary
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environment rather than the secondary, mediated one
(Slater, 2002a). Refer to Slater et al. (2006) for an explanation of using BIPs and physiological responses to
study presence itself.
Following this definition, we suggest that a BIP occurs whenever the participant attends to stimuli that fail
to support the message of the secondary environment.
This means that breaks in presence can be unintentionally generated from the mediated environment itself if
any of its components do not adequately support one
another. Essentially, all components of the environment
must be carefully designed to ensure that the desired
user experience is obtained. In Table 1, building upon
Slater’s ideas, we list example categories of presencebreakers and the situations in which they may occur.
These observations extend traditional approaches to
presence by considering the experiential dimensions of
experience that were outlined above.
A BIP due to external interference is induced by the
primary environment providing input at a level high
enough to be noticed by a user. This could be caused by
loud conversation or by the hardware physically interfering with the user performing a task. Such BIPs can be
best addressed by utilizing quiet rooms and minimizing
the physical side-effects of technology on a user.
Internal interference is probably the most difficult to
control, from an experimental design standpoint. It
would be caused by the user turning to an internally
created environment, rather than attending to the desired mediated one; it is the equivalent of daydreaming.
Mitigating such a BIP would require that the mediated
environment induce enough involvement of the user so
as to prevent attention from drifting.
An obvious example of presence-breaking in virtual
environments is found in the case of inconsistent mediation. When a virtual environment is inconsistently
mediated, there is not enough fidelity to support the
participant’s active engagement with the secondary
environment in a temporally satisfying fashion. Such
BIPs can be particularly jarring when a high-fidelity experience is suddenly transformed into a low one. For
example, a participant might be exploring a virtual forest with trees rendered in stunning detail, but when animals or additional avatars wander into the scene, the
graphics and audio lag noticeably. At this point in time,

the participant is harshly reminded of the secondary environment’s dependency on machinery from the primary
environment. Issues such as network delay, hardware
limitations, or software glitches are primary contributors
to this type of disjointedness. This is different from contradictory mediation in that the information being presented by the mediated environment appropriately
matched the expectations and schema established over
the course of being in the environment.
With contradictory mediation, the provided information fails to match the user’s existing schema from the
start. There is no familiar experience with which to
match the current environment, and BIP occurs while
new schema are developed.
In addition to the lack of information in key virtual
scenarios, too much information can also lead to BIPs.
For example, a participant exploring a multiuser virtual
world might find himself or herself unable to immediately assimilate or respond to the myriad demands for
attention from other characters, the environment, and
objects within that environment. Instead, they first must
relocate to a less popular location or otherwise attenuate
environmental stimuli to a manageable level. This forces
them to attend, at least momentarily, to external cues
such as controls or input devices. Information atypical
of a given scenario may also be problematic; this type of
information is present when an individual’s expectations
for the secondary environment are not compatible with
what is actually occurring within that experience.
In other words, information (sensory, cognitive, or
otherwise) that cannot be readily assimilated into a coherent unit of knowledge will often result in “information overload” (Carey & Kacmar, 1997). Slater hints at
this notion when he says that information has to be
consistent in order to encourage a greater probability
that the correct interpretation for the environment will
be selected (2002a). This is paralleled in the real world
in situations where too much information leads to a
break in attention (e.g., Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). This
is described in Table 1 as “unrefined mediation,” in
which virtual stimuli are not fully packaged into forms
easily absorbable by human participants.
As our example of unrefined mediation suggests,
more information and inputs from the mediated environment are not necessarily advantageous. Even if a vir-
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tual environment encourages presence, it may be lost if
participants are forced to focus their attention on absorbing, assimilating, and making sense of conflicting
information. This is likely to cause participants to shift
their focus away from the mediated environment to
their own, internal environment.
This condition also contributes to “the binding problem,” which is concerned with how the brain integrates
(or fails to integrate) the variety of sensory stimuli into a
single, conscious experience (e.g., Fiore & Salas, 2004).
Essentially, individuals’ memories, processes, and behaviors are guided by schema, learned cognitive structures
used for processing, storing, and manipulating patterns
of information (e.g., Schank & Abelson, 1977; Neisser,
1976). By utilizing the correct combination of schema,
it is theorized that a perceptually-limited VE can still
facilitate high levels of presence because the information
encoded in the schemas will fill in the perceptual gaps
(Harvey & Sanchez-Vives, 2005). In other words,
“some minimal set of sensory cues are needed to establish presence in a place . . . the mind fills in the gaps”
(Slater, 2002b, p. 438).
Researchers have recently studied schema within the
context of virtual worlds, specifically in relation to tasks
such as memory retrieval and object recognition in virtual environments (Flannery & Walles, 2003; Mania,
Robinson, & Brandt, 2005). Flannery and Walles explain the difference between schema-consistent versus
schema-inconsistent objects, and they demonstrate that
individuals react to schema-consistent and schemainconsistent virtual objects in similar manners, regardless of whether the objects are simulated in a virtual
world or tangible in real life. However, in virtual environments, participants’ overall memory sensitivity and
the confidence levels are a little lower, compared to similar real-world situations (Flannery & Walles).
Since schema represent models of prototypical situations, our brains can use existing schematic information
to fill in missing details from new environments or experiences. However, the new stimuli must convey consistent and sufficient information; otherwise, the observer
will not be able to match it with an existing mental template. If this occurs, an accurate and complete schematic
representation of the new experience will not be realized, resulting in the memory of the new event being

poorly encoded and difficult to retrieve at a later time
(cf. Hunt & Ellis, 1974; Mandler, 1980; Tulving,
1983).
Based upon this discussion of schema theory, it may
prove more useful to provide less information, but in a
more holistic manner that takes advantage of a user’s
previous experiences, thus triggering a binding that the
environment itself could not explicitly create. The creation of virtual environments that include more comprehensive experiential factors, attempts to mitigate BIPs
beyond those due to external interference and inconsistent mediation. This process begins by looking at dimensions beyond the heavily studied sensory and cognitive domains (Held & Durlach, 1992; Sheridan, 1992;
Barfield & Weghorst, 1993; Lombard & Ditton, 1997;
Lombard, Reich, Grabe, Bracken, & Ditton, 2000).
The aim is to integrate the various elements of experience—sensory, cognitive, affective, active (personal),
and relational (social)—to construct a model that is capable of eliciting an enhanced sense of presence, and
which hopefully will create an ideal situation for developing accurate, memorable, and stable schema.

6

Conclusion

Experiential design has the potential to improve
the design process of immersive, virtual technologies.
By tailoring the process around maintaining a user’s
experience, factors that otherwise would contribute to
BIPs can be mitigated. This also fits with the idea of
user-centered design (Gabbard, Hix, & Swan, 1999), in
which usability is incorporated into a product throughout the production process. As users interact with the
interface and begin to react with the virtual environment, the designer can shift from one group of factors
associated with the experience to another. Once user
feedback shows adequate levels of sensory satisfaction
and cognition is engaged, for example, the design team
can move toward the next task of stimulating cognitive
interaction to a level sufficient for active/social behaviors to emerge.
This paper closes with a call to other researchers: begin to explore the holistic experience of participating in
mediated environments. As computer science and sen-
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sory technologies continue to advance, we may find that
increased processing power and more realistic sensations
offer diminishing results in terms of presence. We
should begin to look toward the user’s internal response
to the mediated environment on dimensions other than
strictly sensation and cognition. Thus, researchers must
better understand the other parts that contribute to the
overall virtual experience, namely, the participants’ established schema and experiences. By hooking into this
yet-untapped resource, we may find some startling results with interesting implications for both measurement
and design.
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